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I. INTRODUCTION
The starting point for this Article was the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the establishment of the University of Miami
International and Comparative Law Review (“ICLR”), which
broadly coincided with my first visit to Miami in February
1992 to give a job talk, the subject of which was the
European project to create a single internal market.2 The first
course I taught at the University of Miami was a course on
the law of the European Economic Community. Many UM
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reserved.
2 See generally Caroline Bradley, 1992: The Case of Financial Services, 12
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 124 (1991).
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students in the JD and LLM programs were and are
interested in international and comparative law courses.
Since 1992, international law and the law of what is now the
European Union have evolved, both in substance and in
accessibility. In 1992, the Official Journal came to Miami in
microfiche format but during the 1990s it moved online,
making European public documents dramatically more
accessible.3
By the beginning of 1992, Europe was moving
forward from the Single European Act towards Economic
and Monetary Union via the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
in December 1991.4 Between the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty and the summer of 2016, Europe engaged in a general
process
of
widening—expanding
membership—and
deepening—intensifying the links among members5—
although with the evolution of special arrangements for

Cf. Deirdre M. Curtin, Citizens’ Fundamental Right of Access to EU
Information: An Evolving Digital Passepartout?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7,
10 (2000) (“[T]he EU is moving towards a position of (greatly) facilitating
such access to information via digital means and is putting some
emphasis on the function of facilitation of democratic political
participation by citizens in this manner.”).
4 See, e.g., Michael J. Baun, The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany,
France, and European Integration, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 605, 605 (1995).
5See generally Neill Nugent, The Deepening and Widening of the European
Community: Recent Evolution, Maastricht, and Beyond, 30 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 311 (1992); Christina J. Schneider, Domestic Politics and the
Widening–Deepening Trade-off in the European Union, 21 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y
699 (2014).
3
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individual Member States in some areas.6
In June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum
on the question of whether the UK should leave the
European Union (“EU”), in which 51.9% of those who voted
said they wished the UK to leave the EU.7 Implementing
Brexit is a challenge for the UK Government and has
implications for the future of an EU without the UK as a
Member. But the UK Brexit decision is not the only stress the
EU faces in 2017. The EU is still in the process of managing
the sovereign debt crisis that followed the global financial
crisis,8 and the ongoing refugee crisis strains relations
among the EU Member States.9 In Jean-Claude Juncker, the

See, e.g., REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN, OPTING OUT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
5 (2014) (noting that the UK and Denmark negotiated opt-outs with
respect to Economic and Monetary Union).
7 See EU Referendum Results, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, (last visited
Sept. 29, 2017), www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-bysubject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eureferendum/electorate-and-count-information.
8 See IMF, Euro Area Policies: 2017 Article IV Consultation—Press Release;
Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Member Countries,
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 17/235 (July 2017); see also Desmond Dinan,
Governance and Institutions: Implementing the Lisbon Treaty in the Shadow of
the Euro Crisis, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 103, 103 (2011)
(noting “[t]he word ‘crisis’ is much used and abused in the rhetoric of
European integration”).
9 See European Commission Press Release STATEMENT/17/1876,
Migration: Joint Declaration by Commissioner Avramopoulos and the
Ministers of Interior of France, Germany and Italy 1 (July 3, 2017),
6
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President of the European Commission’s, State of the EU
Address in 2016, he noted that the EU faced a number of
ongoing crises: “From high unemployment and social
inequality, to mountains of public debt, to the huge
challenge of integrating refugees, to the very real threats to
our security at home and abroad—every one of Europe’s
Member States has been affected by the continuing crises of
our times.”10 Also in September of 2016, Jacques Delors,
President of the EU Commission from 1985 to 1995, argued
that “[i]n this time of crisis for European identity, it is
essential for the EU to show that it is not paralysed but
ready to act as a leading force in the many challenges we
face: the fight against climate change, increasing inequality,
the need to ensure sustainable and inclusive development,
promoting human rights and ensuring that nobody is left
behind.”11

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-1876_en.pdf
(noting existing “challenges posed by the increasing migratory flow on
the Central Mediterranean route”); see generally Massimo Bordignon &
Simone Moriconi, The Case for a Common European Refugee Policy, 8
BRUEGEL POL’Y CONTRIBUTION, 1,1 (2017).
10 European Commission Press Release SPEECH/16/3043, State of the
Union Address 2016: Towards a Better Europe – A Europe That Protects,
Empowers and Defends (Sept. 14, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_SPEECH-16-3043_en.pdf.
11 See Jacques Delors, Restoring a Europe Built on Values for its Youth, WWF,
(Sept. 12, 2016), wwf.eu/?277870/Jacques-Delors-Restoring-a-Europebuilt-on-values-for-its-youth (publication coincides with Common
Statement by 177 European and National Civil Society Organizations &
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The contrast between 1992 and 2017 could not be
starker. In 1992, the Cold War was at an end,12 European
countries were moving forward with processes of widening
and deepening European integration,13 and regulators were
beginning to build transnational networks to address
common problems.14 By the end of 2016 and, in particular,
after the UK Brexit referendum and the US election,
commentators struggled to understand a world in which
crises and political reactions to those crises disrupted the
international order.15 These weaknesses in the European
components of the transnational order arguably relate back

Trade Unions, A New Europe for People, Planet and Prosperity for All, WWF
(Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.wwf.eu/?277851/A_new_Europe).
12 See Symposium, The End of the Cold War and Theories of International
Relations, 48 INT’L ORG. 155 (1994).
13 Geoffrey Pridham, EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post–
Communist States—Formality and Reality, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 953
(2002).
14 See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 32–33 (1992); see also Ethan Barnaby
Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of
Regulatory Convergence, 46 INT’L ORG. 265, 266 (1992) (“It was the threat of
a bilateral agreement on capital regulation that would have been
disadvantageous to banks based outside New York and London, two of
the world’s most important financial centers, that moved the other G-10
central bankers from mutual education and discussion of common
aversions to collective action. Within two years, the bilateral agreement
thus spread to the other G-10 countries.”).
15 See, e.g., Robin Niblett, Liberalism in Retreat: The Demise of a Dream, 96
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 17.

6
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to decisions made in the late 1980s and early 1990s,16 or even
earlier. The UK has been an irritant in the European project
since before the UK accession, and Euroscepticism in the UK
has a long history.17 Although this article focuses on
developments in the EU, the 2016 US election illustrates that
similar disruptions are occurring on both sides of the

See Matthias Matthijs, Europe After Brexit: A Less Perfect Union, 96
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 85, 86 (“The roots of the EU’s current
crisis can be traced to the 1980s.”); Luigi Guiso et al., Monnet’s Error?, 31
ECON. POL’Y 247, 250 (2016) (“This positive feedback loop, however,
seems to break down with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (and the
simultaneous crisis in the European Monetary System). There is a drop
in support for the European membership and by looking at individual
data this drop is highly correlated with a reduced support for the single
market and for further political integration. This step seems to have
created a permanent backlash.”).
17 See Oliver Daddow, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic
Tradition in Britain, 15 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 210, 212–13 (2013) (“In
this article the British Eurosceptic tradition will be interpreted as that
tradition of thought about Britain’s national identity that sees Britain as
being not only geographically separate from the continental landmass of
Europe but, crucially, as psychologically distant from the European
integration movement formalized in the Rome Treaty of 1957.”); Philip
Lynch & Richard Whitaker, Where There is Discord, Can They Bring
Harmony? Managing Intra-Party Dissent on European Integration in the
Conservative Party, 15 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 317, 321 (2013) (“The
proportion of Eurosceptics in the parliamentary party has grown since
1979, with each new intake more Eurosceptic than the last.”) (internal
citation omitted).
16
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Atlantic.18
The European project has been an important
component of the post–World War II movement to promote
peace through the development of transnational
organizations and linkages.19 These organizations include
the United Nations, established as the successor to the

See Joseph Nye, Jr., Will the Liberal Order Survive?: The History of an Idea,
96 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 10, 14 (“The 2016 presidential election
was marked by populist reactions to globalization and trade agreements
in both major parties, and the liberal international order is a project of
just the sort of cosmopolitan elites whom populists see as the enemy.”);
id. at 15 (attempting to identify sources of the new populism movement
and noting that “[d]iscontent and frustration are likely to continue, and
the election of Trump and the British vote to leave the EU demonstrate
that populist reactions are common to many Western democracies.”); but
see Ruben Durante et al., The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV 4 (Ctr.
for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 1475, 2017),
cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1475.pdf (“While popular discontent
with the political establishment is likely to have deep socioeconomic
roots, our findings suggest that by popularizing certain linguistic codes
and cultural models, entertainment television may have contributed to
creating a fertile ground for the success of populist leaders.”).
19 See generally A. Loveday, The European Movement, 3 INT’L ORG. 620
(1949) (examining several distinct post-war initiatives towards European
union); cf. Jean Monnet, A Ferment of Change, 1 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
203, 204 (1963) (“[T]he countries of continental Europe, which have
fought each other so often in the past and which, even in peacetime,
organized their economies as potential instruments of war, are now
uniting in a Common Market which is laying the foundations for
political union.”).
18
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League of Nations;20 the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), which grew out
of then-Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s plan to
reconstruct Europe;21 and the Bretton Woods organizations:
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”).22 But the geopolitical context in which these
institutions currently operate is very different from their
original context.23 The Cold War, which began in the

See generally Leland M. Goodrich, From League of Nations to United
Nations, 1 INT’L ORG. 3 (1947).
21 See generally Thomas C. Blaisdell Jr., The European Recovery Program—
Phase Two, 2 INT’L ORG. 443 (1948) (describing the European Recovery
Program); Lincoln Gordon, The Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, 10 INT’L ORG. 1, 2 (1956) (“From the very beginning of
systematic Washington consideration of the administrative problems of
the European Recovery Program, it was felt desirable that there be some
form of European institution, both to provide a mechanism for
organizing mutual aid among the beneficiary countries and to serve as a
center where United States representatives could negotiate and consult
on European-wide problems.”).
22 See generally Charles P. Kindleberger, Bretton Woods Reappraised, 5 INT’L
ORG. 32 (1951); Klaus Knorr, The Bretton Woods Institutions in Transition, 2
INT’L ORG. 19 (1948).
23 See generally Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, Final
NAEC Synthesis: New Approaches to Economic Challenges (Paris, June 3–4,
2015), http://www.oecd.org/mcm/documents/Final-NAEC-SynthesisReport-CMIN2015-2.pdf (“NAEC recognises the increased international
economic integration and resulting complexity, and the insights that may
be gained by analysing the global economy as a complex adaptive
system. This will help to take into account uncertainty, spill-overs,
20
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aftermath of World War II, ended with the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, just before ICLR was established (and
presumably part of the dramatic changes Victor MarroquínMerino, the first Editor-in-Chief of ICLR, had in mind in
1991).24
More recently, there have been further geopolitical
shifts with developments in the Middle East, with the new
visibility of China on the world stage, and with a transfer of
some power from governments to non-governmental
entities.25 Increasingly, policy-makers are conscious of a
large number of new risks to the international system and to
individual states: risks of terrorism, financial risks that
spread across borders, and climate change, involving
disruptive weather events, rising sea levels, and threats of
food insecurity.26 National anxiety in the face of these risks is
part of what has caused developments like the UK Brexit

systemic risks and network effects. This analysis, amongst others, will
help policymakers get a better grip on rising global interconnectedness.”)
24 See Victor Marroquín-Merino, Foreword, 1 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. (1991)
(noting then-recent dramatic changes in international law).
25 See Nye, supra note 18, at 13–14.
26 See IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: POTENT POLICIES FOR A
SUCCESSFUL NORMALIZATION 2 (Apr. 2016) (“Increased political
uncertainty related to geopolitical conflicts, political discord, terrorism,
refugee flows, or global epidemics loom over some countries and
regions, and if left unchecked, could have significant spillovers on
financial markets.”).

10
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vote;27 appeals to nationalism and populism are designed to
counter supranational co-operation. But the idea that
globalization, and the development of the EU, have harmed
national interests is controversial: for example, Alan
Milward has argued that the European project has
strengthened, rather than weakened, nation states.28
II. BEFORE 1992: CREATION, WIDENING, DEEPENING
In the aftermath of World War II, Europeans were
imagining the development of closer relationships among
European states in various fora.29 In 1950, Robert Schuman,
then-Foreign Minister of France, set out a specific proposal,

See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2017, 9 (12th
ed. Jan. 11, 2017), www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf
(“This 12th edition of The Global Risks Report is published at a time of
heightened political uncertainty, following a year of unexpected electoral
results, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Polarized societies and political landscapes are taking centre stage in
many countries, with deepening generational and cultural divisions
amplifying the risks associated with sluggish economic recovery and
accelerating technological change.”).
28 See ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION STATE
(1992); see also Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement,
31 WORLD ECON. 158, 161 (2008) (“The interests of European
governments consistently converged across a wide range of issues in
response to a 50-year regional boom in intra-industry trade and
investment, which made Europe by far the most interdependent region
in the world.”).
29 See Loveday, supra note 19.
27
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arguing that “Europe will not be made all at once, or
according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”30
Schuman proposed a pooling of coal and steel production
between France and Germany (that other countries could
join) and argued that “[t]he solidarity in production thus
established will make it plain that any war between France
and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but
materially impossible.”31 Schuman’s idea was implemented
in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community—a body with supranational powers that
Gerhard Bebr described as marking “a basic departure from

Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May, FONDATION ROBERT SCHUMAN
(May 9, 1950), https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/declaration-of-9may-1950; see also JACQUES ZILLER, THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 24 (Mel
Marquis trans., 2005) (“From these words it may be inferred that
European integration is a process of accretion whereby the interests of
different States become, above all for pragmatic reasons, increasingly
intertwined.”).
31 Schuman, supra note 30; cf. William N. Parker, The Schuman Plan—A
Preliminary Prediction, 6 INT’L ORG. 381, 383 (1952) (describing the
Schuman Plan’s intent to create a single market in coal and steel:
“Consequently, interferences with the free movement of these products,
and all distortions of the picture of relative real costs are to be forbidden,
regulated or discouraged. The member governments are obligated to
abolish tariffs, quota restrictions, and impediments to the free movement
of workers and to attack the problem of discriminatory freight rates.
Subsidies to state-owned enterprises or to private producers are
forbidden.”).
30

12

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 25

the conception of all previous international organizations.”32
Subsequently, Europeans agreed to work together with
respect to atomic energy and economic matters.33 The
European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, and the
European Economic Community involved the establishment
of a common market among the Member States—originally
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg34—with a common external tariff, and the

Gerhard Bebr, The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and
Legal Innovation, 63 YALE L. J. 1, 1 (1953); Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
33 See Reuben Efron & Allan S. Nanes, The Common Market and Euratom
Treaties: Supranationality and the Integration of Europe, 6 INT’L & COMP. L.
Q. 670, 678 (1957) (noting that the supranational aspects of the Euratom
and Common Market Treaties were less obvious than with the European
Coal and Steel Community Treaty); id. at 682 (“[T]he framers of these
treaties were evidently quite determined to avoid any demonstrative
phraseology that would arouse the hostility of those industrialists and
political leaders, particularly among the French and Germans, who
object to any infringement on the principle of national sovereignty,
whether from motives of ideology or economic interest. This is clearly
brought out by the fact that in contrast to the Coal and Steel Community
there is absolutely no mention of the word ‘supranationality.’ Yet, as the
authors hope they have shown, this concept has been introduced
through the back door, as it were, in a number of Articles in which
supranationality is implied, if not expressed.”).
34 Cf. Ivo Maes & Amy Verdun, Small States and the Creation of EMU:
Belgium and the Netherlands, Pace-Setters and Gate-Keepers, 43 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 327, 331 (2005) (“Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg
founded the Benelux on 5 September 1944. The purpose was to set up a
32
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breaking down of barriers to free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital.35 This idea of the breaking
down of barriers between separate national markets36 is
often described as negative integration but, along with this
negative integration, the European Treaties provided for
positive integration through the harmonization of rules for a
common European market.37 Jean Monnet argued that the
development of new institutional mechanisms for European
states to work together was “the most important event in the
West since the war.”38

customs union between these countries as soon as the Second World War
was over.”).
35 See Raymond Bertrand, The European Common Market Proposal, 10 INT’L
ORG. 559 (1956). The European Free Trade Association was established in
1959. U.W. Kitzinger, Europe: The Six and the Seven, 14 INT’L ORG. 20, 20
(1960) (“[T]wo separate areas of free trade are being set up, at much the
same pace, the ‘Inner Six’ centered around France and Germany, the
‘Outer Seven’ around Britain and Scandinavia.”).
36 See generally A.W.H. Meij & J.A. Winter, Measures Having an Effect
Equivalent to Quantitative Restrictions, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 79 (1976).
37 Eric Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of European
Integration, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1964) (“[A]ssimilation of national laws
in the Community is an integral part of an intricate plan for a
progressive coalescence of the national economies of the six member
states. Its special function in that plan is to remove those differences
among national laws which impede the process of coalescence.”).
38 Monnet, supra note 19, at 211 (“European unity is the most important
event in the West since the war, not because it is a new great power, but
because the new institutional method it introduces is permanently
modifying relations between nations and men. Human nature does not

14
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In the early years, the implications of the new treaty
arrangements were uncertain and ambiguous.39 Although
early decisions of the European Court of Justice, such as
Costa40 and van Gend en Loos,41 are now seen as the
foundations of a process of Europeanization through law,42

change, but when nations and men accept the same rules and the same
institutions to make sure that they are applied, their behaviour towards
each other changes. This is the process of civilization itself.”).
39 See Leon N. Lindberg, Decision Making and Integration in the European
Community, 19 INT’L ORG. 56, 58 (1965) (“[B]oth the architects of the
Community treaties and the ministers and national experts who take
common decisions in Brussels have rarely had any clear notion of what
the consequences of these acts might be for their respective national
systems, or indeed for the relations between themselves and between
them and the rest of the world.”).
40 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
41 Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming
van Gend en Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin. (van Gend en Loos),
1963 E.C.R. 1; see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Richard M. Buxbaum, N. V.
Algemene Transport- En Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos c.
Administration Fiscale Néerlandaise: A Pioneering Decision of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, 58 Am. J. Int’l L. 152, 152 (1964)
(stating that van Gend en Loos is “unquestionably one of the most
important judgments rendered by that tribunal during the first decade of
its existence”).
42 See G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the
European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 183 (1994) (“The effect of
Van Gend en Loos was to take Community law out of the hands of
politicians and bureaucrats and to give it to the people. Of all the Court’s
democratising achievements none can rank so highly in practical
terms.”).
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it was not always clear how Europe, its law, and its
institutions would evolve.43 During the 1960s, there were
political problems when Charles de Gaulle rebuffed the
UK’s interest in joining the European project44 and when
France’s withdrawal from the Council caused what
commentators described as a “crisis,”45 or the “empty chair
crisis,”46 but which was eventually resolved by means of the

See Antoine Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the
Government of the European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda), 2 INT’L
POL. SOC. 128, 131 (2008) (“The general idea is that Euro-law’s force is not
a substantive feature related to a-historical characteristics of Law, but
rather that it comes out of the various sorts of EU-related economic,
political or bureaucratic struggles in which it has been enrolled in the
course of European history.”).
44 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, De Gaulle Between Grain and
Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 1), 2
J. COLD WAR STUD. 3, 4, 6 (2000); Roy Pryce, Britain Out of Europe?, 2 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 1 (1963).
45 John Lambert, The Constitutional Crisis 1965–66, 4 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 195 (1966). Lambert predicted that similar issues would arise in the
future. Id. at 228 (“The crisis of 1965–66 is to be seen as a constitutional
clash, involving an attempt to change certain basic rules: but it was also
probably part of a more long-term political conflict over the nature of the
Community that in no way ceased when the immediate crisis ended on
29 January. The difference in question can be expected to persist and to
be reflected continually in relations between the member governments
inside and outside the framework of the Treaties.”).
46 See N. Piers Ludlow, Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965–
1966, 8 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 231, 232 (1999) (“A French boycott of the
43
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Luxembourg compromise.47 After the compromise, policymaking was slow,48 and commentators wondered whether
supranationality had a future.49 It is clear that from the very
beginning of the post-war European project, different actors
had different ideas about what that project involved,50 or at
least about who should make decisions about the framing of
the project,51 and these differences of view have persisted

Community institutions had begun and would last until the end of
January 1966. Throughout this time, the French chair at all Community
meetings would remain empty and the French viewpoint unstated, apart
from periodic Delphic utterances by President de Gaulle and his senior
ministers.”); see Id. at 233.
47 Id. at 232–33.
48 See Eric Stein, The European Community in 1983: A Less Perfect Union?, 20
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 641, 647 (1983).
49 See Nina Heathcote, The Crisis of European Supranationality, 5 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 140, 141–42 (1966) (“The still-unresolved conflict of
interest between the EEC’s national members is evidence that the
organization is still an arena of power politics, unmodified by the
supranational framework.”); see generally Maryon McDonald, “Unity in
Diversity”: Some Tensions in the Construction of Europe, 4 SOC.
ANTHROPOLOGY 47 (1996).
50 Loveday, supra note 19.
51 See Ludlow, supra note 46, at 233 (“The breakdown of June 1965, the
article will suggest, should be seen not as the product of French
dissatisfaction with the Community as it existed, but on the contrary as
the outcome of mounting frustration amongst all of France’s partners,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands in particular, about the extent to
which the French had been able to dominate the formative years of the
EEC.”).

2017

EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION

17

through periodic enlargements of membership.
The European project achieved forward movement in
one direction when the UK, Denmark and Ireland acceded to
the treaties in 1973,52 although the enlargement raised new
questions about the legal and political implications of
enlargement,53 as well as the economic impact of
enlargement.54 The introduction of new Member States with
different interests and including actors with more different
views made agreement on the future of Europe more, rather
than less, complicated.55 But although enlargement was
progress of a sort, the widening was not accompanied by the

Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
(1972), O.J. No. L 73 (Mar. 27, 1972).
53 See Stanley Henig, New Institutions for European Integration 12 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 129 (1973); L.J. Brinkhorst & M.J. Kuiper, The
Integration of the New Member States in the Community Legal Order, 9
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 364 (1972). Norway also negotiated to join, but
Norwegian citizens voted to reject membership. See Einar Lie, Masters
and Servants: Economists and Bureaucrats in the Dispute Over Norwegian
EEC Membership in 1972, 24 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 279 (2015).
54 W. G. C. M. Haack, The Economic Effects of Britain’s Entry into the
Common Market, 11 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 136 (1972).
55 See Stein, supra note 48, at 655 (“In the running debate on the
Community’s future, some wonder whether the original Community
pattern, although suitable for a homogenous group of six states, is
workable for a Community of ten, twelve or more states with diverse
cultures, legal systems and levels of development (Greece, Portugal,
Spain, eventually Turkey).”).
52
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sort of deepening that many hoped for.56 During the 1970s
European states grappled with economic problems which
raised questions about the usefulness of European
integration.57 Nevertheless, further enlargements followed:
Greece acceded in 1981,58 and Spain and Portugal followed
in 1986.59 But enlargement was part of what led
commentators to speculate about possibilities for a multispeed Europe in which different rules would apply to

Some have argued that deepening should occur before widening. See,
e.g., Ziller, supra note 30, at 153 (“[M]any have repeatedly argued that the
integration project must be consolidated and “deepened” before the
Community— with the argument now applying to the Union— is
expanded any further.”).
57 See Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the
European Council, on the European Union, E.C. BULL. Supp., no. 1 (1976)
at 11 (“[W]e plunged into a crisis and are experiencing rates of inflation
and unemployment the likes of which have never been seen by the
present generation. It is therefore hardly surprising if the Community is
crumbling beneath the resurgence, which is felt everywhere, of purely
national preoccupations. Especially as the Community, in its present
state, is unbalanced: in some fields it has been given far-reaching
powers, in others nothing, or practically nothing, has been done, very
often because our States were too weak to undertake anything new . . .”).
58 See, e.g., Commission Opinion of 23 May 1979 on the application for
accession to the European Communities by the Hellenic Republic, 1979
O.J. (L 291) 22.
59 See Decision of the Council of the European Communities of 11 June
1985 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese
Republic to the European Coal and Steel Community, 1985 O.J. (L 302)
28.
56
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different Member States.60
By 1991, after the adoption of the Single European
61
Act, Andrew Moravscik identified a new period of hope
for the future of Europe.62 The Single European Act was
presented as a reinvigoration of the European project where
the Member States agreed to work at creating an internal
market for Europe (a reframing of the original common

See Alexander C-G. Stubb, A Categorization of Differentiated Integration,
34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 283 (1996); Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli,
On the Feasibility of a One-speed or Multispeed European Monetary Union, 5
ECON. & POL.145, 146 (1993) (arguing that “proceeding at “two speeds”
or more will jeopardize the achievement of complete integration.”);
Eberhard Grabitz & Bernd Langeheine, Legal Problems Related to a
Proposed “Two-Tier System” of Integration Within the European Community,
18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 33 (1981).
61 See Juliet Lodge, The Single European Act: Towards a New EuroDynamism?, 24 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 203 (1986).
62 See Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act: National
Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community, 45 INT’L
ORG. 19, 19 (1991) (“The late 1970s and early 1980s were periods of
‘Europessimism’ and ‘Eurosclerosis,’ when politicians and academics
alike lost faith in European institutions. The current period is one of
optimism and institutional momentum.”) Cf. Neil Fligstein & Iona MaraDrita, How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single
Market in the European Union, 102 AM. J. SOC. 1, 3 (1996) (noting that the
single market “project took the EU from an organization in crisis to one
that was able to attain some remarkable agreements.”); contra e.g.,
Lodge, supra note 61, at 221 (noting “a danger... that the pragmatism that
it embodies may, as in the past, discourage Member States from taking
the steps necessary for progress”).
60
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market idea rather than a wholly new project)63 by the end
of 1992.64 It was initially unclear what this single market
would involve,65 although the Commission published a
White Paper in 1985 with an analysis of the steps necessary
to create a single market.66 The UK joined in agreeing to the
Single European Act and the 1992 initiative.67
Comparing the attitudes to the condition of Europe of
observers at the beginning of the 1990s with attitudes in
2017, there seems to be a contrast between attitudes of hope
(then) and attitudes of uncertainty and anxiety (now).68 This
raises the question of how Europe changed from an

See Fligstein & Mara-Drita, supra note 62, at 11.
See PAOLO CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE: 1992 THE BENEFITS OF
A SINGLE MARKET (1988).
65 Fligstein & Mara-Drita, supra note 62, at 11 (“The biggest problem of
this idea was to define what a single market meant.”); cf. Lodge, supra
note 61, at 210-212.
66 See generally Commission White Paper: Completing the Internal Market,
COM (85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
67 See, e.g., Daddow, supra note 17, at 217 (“It should not be forgotten,
however, that in between times, [Margaret Thatcher] willingly signed
Britain up to one of the most integrationist European treaties of recent
times, the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), which created the single
European market in the 1990s.”).
68 The twenty-seven Member States apart from the UK have, as of
August 2017, managed the process of negotiating over Brexit more
effectively than the UK has, increasing confidence within the EU, but
uncertainties and anxieties remain. See European Council Meeting
Conclusions, EUCO 8/17 (Jun. 23, 2017) (noting concerns relating to
terrorism, defense, climate change, jobs and growth, and migration).
63
64
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enterprise of hope to an existential crisis. Three sets of issues
help to understand this evolution. The first involves the
problematic ideas of an ever-closer union and a single
market, and the idea of continuous forward movement. The
second relates to crisis and the European (and national and
international) response to crisis. The third involves the
conflict between technocratic and political governance. But it
should also be noted that the contrast between then and now
may be less stark than some sources suggest. From the
beginning, the European project involved differences of
opinion and uncertainties that sometimes were more
obvious and sometimes less so. 2017 may be one of those
periods where the tensions are more visible.
III. 1992 AND BEYOND: AN EVER-CLOSER UNION,
MARKET, AND CONTINUOUS FORWARD MOVEMENT

A

SINGLE

Although the Single Market Act proposed the
creation of a single European market in 1992, many
commentators think that the EU’s single market is
incomplete twenty-five years later.69 Ideas embedded in the
European treaties such as the internal market and ever-

See, e.g., Mario Mariniello, André Sapir & Alessio Terzi, The Long Road
Towards the European Single Market, 2 (Bruegel Working Paper 2015/01
2015) (noting that a “commonly held opinion among observers today is
that the single market is far from being complete.”).
69
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closer union,70 have always been ambiguous and susceptible
to different interpretations. It has never been clear, for
example, whether a single market requires uniform rules or
not, and, if not, how much differentiation in rules is
consistent with a single market.71 These ambiguities are the
product of differences in views among the negotiators of the
texts. Ambiguity allows for agreement without the need to
pin down exactly what is agreed. Ambiguity then allows for
subsequent political negotiation to determine the contours of
the European project (although some ambiguities are
resolved through decisions of courts rather than legislators
or Treaty negotiators.). However, ambiguity also leaves
open opportunities for contestation which can be
problematic.
The Court of Justice has resolved some textual
ambiguities in the Treaties by adopting a teleological
approach to interpretation, an approach which is sometimes
characterized as “constitutionalizing” the Treaties or as

See Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement, 31 THE
WORLD ECONOMY 157, 157 (2008) (“For five decades, the primary concern
of European integration was summarised in the 1950s-era technocratic
slogan embedded in the Treaty of Rome’s preamble: ‘Ever Closer
Union.’”).
71 Cf. Barry Eichengreen, European Monetary Unification, 31, J. ECON. LIT.
1321, 1322 (1993) (“I dispute the belief that a single currency is a
technically necessary concomitant of a single market in capital, labor,
and goods.”).
70
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being “creative.”72 Beyond resolving ambiguities, the Court
of Justice has also developed EU law over time in ways not
compelled by the express language of the Treaties.73 For
example, the Court recognized that fundamental rights were
part of EU law before they were spelled out in the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights.74 Another example is the

See G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26
COMMON MKT. L REV. 595, 596 (1989) (“[T]he Court has sought to
‘constitutionalise’ the Treaty, that is to fashion a constitutional
framework for a federal-type structure in Europe.”); See also, e.g., id. at
599 (“The now undisputed existence of a supremacy clause in the
Community framework is therefore a product of judicial creativeness.”);
Cf. Dagmar Schiek, The ECJ Decision in Mangold: A Further Twist on Effects
of Directives and Constitutional Relevance of Community Equality Legislation,
35 INDUS. L. J. 329, 335 (2006) (“With Mangold, the Court of Justice grants
a more far-reaching effect to the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of age. The recognition of the constitutional quality of the
prohibition on discrimination will surely have consequences beyond
Mangold, especially as it can hardly remain confined to the ground of
age.”).
73 See, e.g., Vauchez, supra note 43, at 134 (“Principles such as ‘direct
effect,’ ‘supremacy,’ ‘principle of proportionality’ or ‘rule of speciality,’
which have become undisputed description tools of the EU polity, are
specific legal constructions that do not draw on the treaties themselves as
much as they do on the science of law for which, at the end of the day,
lawyers are the only judges.”).
74 See Jason Coppell & Aidan O’Neill, The European Court of Justice:
Taking Rights Seriously?, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 669, 670-1 (1992)
(“[T]he European Court discovered that the protection of fundamental
rights was indeed a general principle of European Community law. This
development ...was effected notwithstanding the absence of any mention
72
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Court’s enhancement of the enforceability of citizens’ legal
rights by the recognition of a right for people to go to court
in a Member State and claim damages for the Member
State’s violations of EU law.75 This right to damages has
itself evolved over time,76 so that a claim in damages against
the State may now relate to the failure of courts in the

or list of fundamental rights within the texts of the Community
treaties.”); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions
Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of
Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European
Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986) (“If one ever needed an
example of sheer judicial power it would appear to be in this particular
“saga.” . . . in the absence of a written bill of rights in the Treaty and an
apparent freedom for the Community legislature to disregard individual
rights in Community legislation, the European Court of Justice, in an
exercise of bold judicial activism, and a reversal of earlier case law,
created a judge-made higher law of fundamental human rights, culled
from the constitutional traditions of the Member States and international
agreements such as the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).”).
75 See, e.g., Paul Craig, Francovich, Remedies and the Scope of Damages
Liability, 109 L. Q. REV. 595, 596 (1993) (“The existence of liability was
established through a blend of reasoning from first principle, and
through reliance on textual foundation in the Treaty itself.”).
76 See Carol Harlow, Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State, 2
EUR. L. J. 199 (1996). Cf. Tobias Lock, Is Private Enforcement of EU Law
Through State Liability a Myth?: An Assessment 20 Years after Francovich, 49
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1675 (2012).
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Member State to interpret and apply EU law properly.77
Member State governments who see the Court of Justice as
interpreting the Treaties in surprising ways may react by
becoming entrenched in positions which are not favourable
to the promotion of the European project.78 Worries about
European overreach led to the development of the doctrine
of subsidiarity,79 and over time the ways in which the EU

See, e.g., Lock, supra note 76, at 1676 (“In Köbler the ECJ later extended
the doctrine of Member State liability to also cover breaches by the
judiciary where the infringement of European Union law was
manifest.”).
78 Cf. Vauchez, supra note 43, at 141 (“It is well known that over the past
15 years the number of critics of the ECJ has increased far beyond the
restricted circles of eurosceptics. It comes as no surprise that the recent
politicization of EU debates is now touching the European Court of
Justice... itself denounced for its many biases (from its neo-liberal or
ordo-liberal agenda to its ‘tentacular’ development at the expense of
national legal sovereignty).”).
79 See, e.g., Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity, 6 J. OF POL. PHIL. 190, 191(1998)
(“The principle of subsidiarity was introduced in the European Union in
the late 1980s through the initiative of the European Parliament, Britain
and Germany in response to fears of centralized power by placing the
burden of argument with integrationists.”); Cf. Kees van Kersbergen &
Bertjan Verbeek, The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union, 32 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 215, 216 (1994) (“[T]he theory of subsidiarity was
put on the European political agenda in the late 1970s by Christian
democratic members of the European Parliament in an interesting, yet—
in light of recent developments—paradoxical effort to justify the
enlargement of the competences of the European Commission. It was only in
77
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managed subsidiarity have evolved to include national
parliaments
as
subsidiarity
monitors.80
However,
subsidiarity, like other aspects of the EU, has its own
ambiguities.81 Recently, concern about decisions of the Court
of Justice have been part of the UK Government’s discomfort
with EU membership (although sometimes the roles of the
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights
seem to have become intertwined in politicians’
imaginations).82
The UK is not the only locus of resistance to the idea
that European Court decisions might pre-empt conflicting

the 1990s that subsidiarity evolved into a principle for curbing the
potential expansion of power of the European Commission.”).
80 See Ian Cooper, The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and
the Logic of Arguing in the EU, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 281 (2006).
81 See, e.g., van Kersbergen & Verbeek, supra note 79, at 221 (“Three views
of the relationship between state and society have furnished three
different interpretations of subsidiarity: (1) christian democratic
ideology, (2) German federalism, and (3) British conservatism. The
lowest common denominator of all three is a narrow legal view which
envisions subsidiarity solely as a constitutional arrangement between
central and local public actors.”).
82 Cf. House of Lords, European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a
British Bill of Rights, HL Paper 139 (May 9, 2016) at 8 (“The EU Charter is
often confused with the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), as the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg (the CJEU) is
with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (the ECtHR).
While both contain overlapping human rights provisions, they operate
within separate legal frameworks.”).

2017

EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION

27

domestic law.83 Whereas the Court of Justice has been very
clear that EU law has the characteristic of supremacy,84
national courts have not always accepted this idea
unconditionally. Germany is the most prominent example of
this tension between EU supremacy and domestic
Constitutional law.85 Over many years the Court of Justice
and German courts navigated this terrain very carefully, but
the tension resurfaced in the wake of the financial crisis
when German citizens challenged some of the EU’s

Cf. Karen J. Alter, Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European
Governments and the European Court of Justice, 50 INT’L ORG. 121, 123
(1998) (“The ECJ, however, interpreted existing EC laws in ways that
member states had not intended and in ways that compromised strongly
held interests and beliefs. As member states began to object to ECJ
jurisprudence, they found it difficult to change EU legislation to reverse
court decisions or to attack the jurisdiction and authority of the ECJ.
Because there was no consensus among states to attack the authority of
the ECJ, member states lacked a credible threat that could cow the Court
into quiescence. Instead, the institutional rules combined with the lack of
political consensus gave the ECJ significant room to maneuver.”).
84 See Id. at 126.
85See Philipp Kiiver, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional
Court: A Court-ordered Strengthening of the National Legislature in the EU 16
EUR. L. J.578 (2010); Gunnar Beck, The Lisbon Judgment of the German
Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of KompetenzKompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor,
17 EUR. L. J. 470 (2011).
83
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responses on the basis that they were ultra vires.86 The courts’
reactions to these issues have been unusual. One
commentator wrote that “if the preliminary referral in OMT
evidenced an unexpected desire on the part of the BVG to set
the entire system on fire by actually declaring an EU act ultra
vires, the ECJ in Gauweiler appeared completely content to
drop off matches and lighter fluid at the front door of the
Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.”87
The European project is often analyzed in terms of
moving forward, or failing to do so.88 Progress or forward
movement is inherent in the terminology of an ever-closer

See, e.g., Monica Claes & Jan-Herman Reestman, The Protection of
National Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European Integration at the
Occasion of the Gauweiler Case, 16 GER. L. J. 917 (2015).
87 John Henry Dingfelder Stone, Agreeing to Disagree: The Primacy Debate
Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of
Justice, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 127, 150 (2016).
88 See, e.g., Erik Jones, R. Daniel Kelemen & Sophie Meunier, Failing
Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration,
49 COMP. POL. STUD. 1010, 1012 (2015) (“Why have piecemeal responses
forged by minimum winning coalitions in the heat of crisis consistently
moved the EU in the direction of deeper integration over time, rather
than toward a dismantling of shared governance institutions and market
structures? This tendency to pursue ever deeper integration is a puzzle
because it suggests that there is an underlying dynamic connecting
iterated intergovernmental bargains. As a result of this dynamic, the EU
appears to “fail forward”: again and again responding to the failures of
incremental reforms by taking new steps to expand the scope and
intensity of integration.”).
86
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union, and, although the idea of an ever-closer union might
seem to require only the deepening of relationships between
the Member States, in fact it has also involved widening, or
an expansion of membership.89 The emphasis on progress
towards closer union means that failures to achieve forward
movements are risky:90 managing Europe is sometimes
analogized to riding a bicycle (where stopping risks falling
off).91 Enlargement is a component of this forward

On enlargements since 1991, see Roger J. Goebel, The European Union
Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and
Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1092 (1994); Pridham, supra note 13; see
also Frank Schimmelfennig, EU Political Accession Conditionality After the
2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness, 15 J. EUR. PUB. POLY. 918
(2008).
90 See, e.g., Henig, supra note 53, at p 129 (“By its very nature the
Community cannot stand still: the notion of consolidation is alien to the
process of integration. When ‘spill-over’ becomes inoperative and
member governments refuse to extend the sphere of integration, the
Community is bound to wither.”). Cf. Luigi Guiso et al., supra note 16, at
251 (“Since the survival of the euro is dependent upon further transfers
of national powers to the EU, then the European Project seems to be
stuck: Europeans do not want to go forward, they do not want to go
backward, but they cannot stay still.”).
91 See Rorden Wilkinson, Language, Power and Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 16 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 597, 604 (2009) (“At its simplest,
the bicycle metaphor suggests that trade liberalization, like the forward
motion required to keep a bicycle moving, needs to be in a state of
perpetual motion. If that motion were to cease, the process (like the
bicycle) would collapse and cause injury to the global economy/the
bicycle’s rider.”) Wilkinson discusses the metaphor with respect to trade
89
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movement but enlargement involves complexities. The new
Member States need to adapt to the existing acquis
communautaire, both in terms of formal adjustment of their
legal regimes, but also in terms of adjusting their approach
to government. Compliance with EU norms relating to the
rule of law is expected,92 but not always achieved, and it is
hard for the EU institutions to police non-compliance
effectively.93
If the move from six to ten Member States made
agreement more complex, the transition to a Union of
twenty-eight Member States increased this complexity
significantly. Enlargements increasing the diversity of the
Member States have implications for social cohesion in the

liberalization generally, rather than specifically with respect to the EU.
For the bicycle metaphor with respect to the EU see, e.g., Moravcsik,
supra note 70, at 158.
92 See Commission Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the
Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158 final/2 (Mar. 19, 2014).
93 See, e.g., Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland,
at 7, C (2016) 8950 final (Dec. 21, 2016) (“[T]he present Recommendation
complements the Recommendation of 27 July 2016. It examines which of
the concerns raised in that recommendation have been addressed, sets
out the remaining concerns and lists a number of new concerns of the
Commission with regard to the rule of law in Poland which have arisen
since then. On this basis, it makes recommendations to the Polish
authorities on how to address these concerns.”).
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EU,94 which again makes political agreement among the
Member States more difficult to achieve.95 And some
national governments have decided to seek the approval of
their citizens for EU developments, which means that
changes need citizen as well as governmental approval. The
EU’s attempt to adopt a Constitutional Treaty, after a
prolonged
complex
negotiating
process
involving
participants
from
national
parliaments,
national
governments, the European Parliament and the
Commission,96 and an Intergovernmental Conference,97
managed to overcome the difficulty of achieving agreement
among the Member State governments,98 only to run into
opposition from citizens expressed in referenda.99 In the end,

See Jan Delhey, Do Enlargements Make the European Union Less Cohesive?
An Analysis of Trust between EU Nationalities, 45 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
253 (2007).
95 See Schneider, supra note 5.
96 See Ziller, supra note 30, at 85.
97 Id. at 106-115.
98 Id., at 29 (“[I]t is clear that the imperfect but impressive text produced
by the Convention— later adopted mostly intact by the European
Council— is a hybrid text reflecting hard-won compromises between
opposing visions of the purpose and direction of European
integration.”).
99 See Paul Taggart, Questions of Europe – The Domestic Politics of the 2005
French and Dutch Referendums and their Challenge for the Study of European
Integration, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. ANNUAL REVIEW 7 (2006).
94
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the EU managed to find a way through the opposition.100
The EU Member States are diverse: in terms of size101
and wealth102: Luxembourg has a population of about
550,000 people, but is very wealthy; Bulgaria has a
population 14 times that of Luxembourg but its GDP is
smaller. In 2014, the GDPs of the EU Member States ranged
from $11.2 billion (Malta103, which has an even smaller
population than Luxembourg) to nearly $4 trillion

See Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not
Hearts, 45 COMMON MKT L. REV. 617 (2008); Dinan, supra note 8.
101 Influence within the EU system is not inevitably merely a function of
size. See, e,.g., Maes & Verdun, supra note 34, at 330 (“The influence of
states on the European integration process is related only in part to their
size.”).
102 Moravcsik, supra note 70, at 163 (noting, with respect to the 2004
enlargement, that “[t]he GDP of the 10 new members of the EU totaled
only 3 percent of the GDP of existing members, and their demands on
existing EU budgetary spending, agricultural policy and free movement
rules were carefully restricted.”); Cf. Schneider, supra note 5, at 701 (“All
studies assume that enlargement has generally increased the
heterogeneity of preferences among EU members. Empirically,
heterogeneity of preferences has been measured mostly as the
heterogeneity in gross domestic product (GDP) within the Council
because income is an important conflict dimension.”); Schneider argues
that enlargement does not have the same sort of impact on partisan
heterogeneity, which is affected by elections. See Id. at 709.
103 See, e.g. Malta, The World Bank, (last visited Dec. 15, 2017),
https://data.worldbank.org/country/malta.
100
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(Germany104, which has a population of over 80 million).
There are economic differences between the Member States
in terms of how developed their economies are and how
significant agriculture or fishing or financial services are to
the economy. The refugee crisis highlighted differences
between the different Member States: Italy and Greece,
located at the edges of the EU nearest to the origins of the
refugees have been more directly affected by an influx of
refugees than other Member States further away.105 Some
Member States have more diverse populations than others,
although identifying causal relationships between
population diversity and attitudes to immigration is

See, e.g. Germany, The World Bank, (last visited Dec. 15, 2017),
https://data.worldbank.org/country/Germany.
105 See EU Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, Joint Communication: Migration on the Central
Mediterranean Route Managing Flows, Saving Lives, at 3, JOIN (2017) 4 final
(Jan. 25, 2017) (“In 2016, over 181,000 irregular migrants were detected
on the Central Mediterranean route, the vast majority of whom reached
Italy. Italy reported an 18% increase in arrivals compared to 2015, a
number even surpassing the previous peak of 2014. Arrivals to Malta are
low in comparison. Libya was the main country of departure for almost
90% of migrants, followed by Egypt (7%), Turkey (1.9%), Algeria (0.6%)
and Tunisia (0.5%).”) The agreement between the EU and Turkey
reduced the impact of migration on Greece; Commission Communication,
Eighth Report on Relocation and Resettlement, at 6, COM (2016) 791 final
(Dec. 8, 2016) (citing variations in the willingness of Member States to
accept relocation of refugees from Italy and Greece, and in particular,
that Austria and Hungary had not participated in any relocations or
pledges to do so).
104
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complex,106 and even the more diverse Member States
include citizens who focus on national identity, which can
result in hostility to immigration and immigrants, whether
from other EU Member States or from outside the EU.107
The differences between the Member States matter
when they make reaching agreement on policy questions
more difficult,108 and when policy decisions combine
different Member States in regimes (like the regime for the
Euro) that do not take full account of the differences.109 In

James Laurence & Lee Bentley, Does Ethnic Diversity Have a Negative
Effect on Attitudes towards the Community? A Longitudinal Analysis of the
Causal Claims within the Ethnic Diversity and Social Cohesion Debate, 32
EUR. SOCIOL. REV. 54 (2015). Attitudes to immigration may be influenced
by individuals’ personality traits; Markus Freitag & Carolin Rapp, The
Personal Foundations of Political Tolerance towards Immigrants, 41 J. ETHNIC
MIGRATION STUD. 351 (2015).
107 Cf. John Sides & Jack Citrin, European Opinion About Immigration: The
Role of Identities, Interests and Information, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 477, 478
(2007) (“Amid all the talk of a growing sense of European identity, the
present research points to the explanatory power of identification with
the nation-state and beliefs about the nation-state’s cultural identity.”).
108 Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community:
A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 473, 474
(1993) (arguing that Europe should be seen in terms of “liberal
intergovernmentalism:
a
liberal
theory
of
how
economic
interdependence
influences
national
interests,
and
an
intergovernmentalist theory of international negotiation.”).
109 Economic and Monetary Union combined Germany, a strong
economy with a strong currency with other, weaker economies with
weaker currencies. The Stability and Growth Pact was designed to
106
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addition to economic differences there are also differences
between the Member States in attitudes to religion,110 and in
the diversity of their populations.111 And the possible
accession of Turkey112— supported by the EU’s reliance on

address this problem. Martin Heipertz & Amy Verdun, The Dog That
Would Never Bite? What We Can Learn from the Origins of the Stability and
Growth Pact, 11 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 765, 768 (2004) (“The political
background of the SGP can be traced back to German domestic politics.
It was used to comfort public opinion and to appease the Bundesbank.
The German public needed reassurance on EMU as it had become
extremely anxious about giving up the well-proven Deutschmark in
favour of a new single currency that would include traditionally weak
economies which lacked a stability culture”) But the Stability and
Growth Pact was not very effective. See id. at 776 (“A number of
countries no longer act as if the SGP budgetary ceilings are to be taken
seriously”) Eventually there was a crisis in the Euro Area.
110 Ziller, supra note 30, at 5.
111 See, e.g., ANIKO HORVATH ET AL, TOLERANCE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY
DISCOURSES IN HUNGARY, Reports 4 (CTR. POL’Y STUD. 2011) (“Immigrants
in Hungary, although very small in number, are also typically viewed
with a combination of fear and distrust.”); cf. COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CULTURALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES GUIDELINES ADOPTED
BY THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS AND COMPILATION OF COUNCIL OF
EUROPE STANDARDS 9 (2016) (“Conscious of the increasing cultural
diversity in European societies and underlining that diversity is a source
of enrichment which calls for mutual understanding and respect for each
other”).
112 Turkey expressed interest in becoming part of the European project in
1987. Cf Schimmelfennig, supra note 89, at 919 (“[E]ven existing
commitments to Turkey and the Western Balkans have come under
pressure from relevant member states. After 2004, ‘enlargement fatigue’
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Turkey to manage the immigration crisis,113 but imperiled by
the state of emergency which raises issues of human rights
and the rule of law114— would only increase the differences
between EU Member States.
Deepening—development of an ever-closer union
between the Member State—has occurred along with
enlargement. The Maastricht Treaty began the transition
from a European Community to a European Union, and
introduced new “pillars” of European integration: a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the idea of

has been seen as the prevailing mood in Brussels, in many member state
capitals, and among EU citizens.”).
113 See, e.g., EU-Turkey Statement Press Release 144/16 (Mar. 18, 2016);
Cf. Commission Communication, A European Agenda on Migration, at 2,
COM (2015) 240 final (May 13, 2015) (“Emergency measures have been
necessary because the collective European policy on the matter has fallen
short. While most Europeans have responded to the plight of the
migrants, the reality is that across Europe, there are serious doubts about
whether our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of
migrants, to the need to integrate migrants in our societies, or to the
economic demands of a Europe in demographic decline.”).
114 See, e.g., Kareem Shaheen, Patrick Wintour & Jennifer Rankin, Turkey
Threatens to End Refugee Deal in Row over EU Accession, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 25, 2016). If Turkey were an EU Member State its actions against
judges, prosecutors, journalists, mayors, removing parliamentary
immunity from deputies of the National Assembly, would involve issues
with respect to Treaty provisions on the rule of law.
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European citizenship, and economic and monetary union.115
These aspects of deepening have not, however, all been
unproblematic. Economic and monetary union and the euro
were conceived as much for political as for economic
reasons, and failures of compliance with the requirements of
the Stability and Growth Pact and political failures to police
compliance with those requirements led to a European
sovereign debt crisis.116 The (disputed) notion that the EU is
the source of an ever increasing, and even excessive,
proportion of domestic rule-making in the Member States,117

See Joseph M. Grieco, the Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary
Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme 21 REV. INT’L STUD. 21
(1995).
116 See, e.g., Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26 J. ECON.
PERSP. 49, 56 (2012) (noting that the “revelation of extreme violation of
the euro’s fiscal rules on the part of Greece also shaped an influential
political narrative of the crisis, which laid the primary blame on the fiscal
irresponsibility of the peripheral nations, even though the underlying
financial and macroeconomic imbalances were more important
factors.”).
117 Moravcsik, supra note 70, at 175 (“In 1988, Jacques Delors famously
predicted that in 10 years ‘80 percent of economic, and perhaps social
and fiscal policy-making’ in Europe would be of EU origin. This
prediction has become a fundamental ‘factoid’ in discussions of the EU–
often cited as a claim that 80 percent of law making in all issues in
Europe already comes from Brussels. Yet recent academic studies
demonstrate that the actual percentage of EU-based legislation is
probably between 10 and 20 percent of national rule making.”).
115
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produces political opposition.118
Other aspects of deepening within the EU over the
last quarter century include the evolution of institutional
structures.119 For example, the allocation of voting rights
among citizens and the Member States has changed,120 the
EU Parliament has more power than it used to have,121 many
EU legislative measures are now adopted on the basis of a
legislative procedure involving the Parliament and approval
by a majority of the Member States representing a majority
of the EU population;122 and there is a broad range of EU
level agencies.123 As a result of the prevalence of legislation

See Mark Pollack, The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy-Making
Since Maastricht, 39J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 519, 520 (2000) (arguing that
during the 1990s there was a “backlash against the spread of centralized
policy-making in the EU.”).
119 Moravcsik, supra note 70 (discussing the evolution of institutional
structures).
120 See Christopher Lord & Johannes Pollak, Unequal but Democratic?
Equality According to Karlsruhe, 20 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 190 (2013).
121 See Moravcsik, supra note 70, at 178 (“[T]he EU itself has not increased
in popularity with the significant expansion in the powers of the EP over
the past five years.”).
122 Charlotte Burns, Anne Rasmussen, & Christine Reh, Legislative
Codecision and its Impact on the Political System of the European Union, 20 J.
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 941 (2013) (introducing a special issue on twenty years of
legislative codecision in the European Union).
123 Morten Egeberg & Jarle Trondal, Researching European Union Agencies:
What Have We Learnt (and Where Do We Go from Here)?, 55 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD.1, 1-16 (2017).
118

2017

EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION

39

by majority vote, member states are bound by legislative
measures they may not have agreed with. Also, there has
been an increase in the number of EU level rules. Over time
there is more harmonization of more aspects of the law in
the EU member states.124
The combination of the supremacy or primacy of EU
law, and a perception that decisions about legal rules and
policy are increasingly taken by EU institutions rather than
by national governments, became a problem after the onset
of the financial crisis. Citizens who tolerated centralization
of decision-making when times were good were less happy
with such centralization in times of crisis.125 For example, the
EU and the IMF imposed austerity measures on Greece as a
condition of financial support, and these measures generated
mass opposition in Greece.126
The next section of the paper looks at how crises have

Upgrading the Single Market: More Opportunities for People and Business,
at 1, COM (2015) 550 final (Oct. 28, 2015) (“The European Commission
that came into office in November 2014 is responding to these challenges.
It has made increasing jobs, growth and investment its top priority and is
pursuing it by deepening the Single Market across sectors and policy
areas.”).
125 See Fabio Serricchio, Myrto Tsakatika & Lucia Quaglia, Euroscepticism
and the Global Financial Crisis, 51 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 51 (2013) (“[T]he
crisis seems to have enhanced the role of public confidence in national
political institutions, and that of national identity, in accounting for
Eurosceptic tendencies at the level of public opinion.”).
126 Wolfgang Rüdig & Georgios Karyotis, Who Protests in Greece? Mass
Opposition to Austerity, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 487, 487 (2014).
124
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affected the current situation of the EU.
IV. CRISIS AND RESPONSES TO CRISIS
Over the last decade, the EU has faced a cascade of
new crises, from the global financial crisis through the
European sovereign debt crisis to a refugee crisis. The global
financial crisis began in the US, rather than in the EU, and
infected financial institutions and markets and ordinary
people around the globe. The crisis stressed EU financial
institutions and led member states to bail out these financial
institutions, which, in turn, strained public finances.127
Because EU capital adequacy rules did not force banks to
distinguish between risky and less risky sovereign debt, EU
banks continued to invest in riskier, and more profitable
sovereign debt. This led to a serious problem of mutual
dependence between banks and sovereigns, which some
commentators described as a vicious circle.128 This mutual
dependence problem was particularly acute in the

See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the
Effervescence of Financial Crisis, 33 L. & POL’Y 428, 428 (2011) (“In 2010 it
became clear that sovereign states, which had “bailed out” the banking
sector, were themselves becoming targets of a mixture of speculation and
genuine fears and uncertainties over their financial health.”).
128 See, e.g., Ashoka Mody & Damiano Sandri, The Eurozone Crisis: How
Banks and Sovereigns Came to be Joined at the Hip, 27 ECON. POL’Y 199
(2012); DAVID HOWARTH & LUCIA QUAGLIA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
EUROPEAN BANKING UNION (2016).
127
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Eurozone,129 and the developing crisis in the Eurozone
demonstrated weaknesses in governance.130 The problems in
the Eurozone were especially significant as the idea of
Economic and Monetary Union was so central to the idea of
the ever-closer union.131 The EU’s response to the financial
crises involved an acceleration and intensification of

Mark Hallerberg, Fiscal Federalism Reforms in the European Union and
the Greek Crisis, 12 EUR. UNION POL. 127, 128 (2011) (“The sovereign debt
crisis in Greece in the spring of 2010 and, to a much lesser extent, in
Ireland, Spain and Portugal seemed to change everything. It put
significant pressure on the euro and on the governance structures of the
euro zone. It also made clear the degree to which all countries in the euro
zone are connected to one another. Budget decisions in one of the
smallest economies in the euro zone had implications for all countries
that have the euro.”).
130 See, e.g., OECD, ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GREECE 11 (OECD, 2011) (“The dire
economic situation was magnified by lost credibility as serious
deficiencies in statistical monitoring of government accounts were
exposed.”); Manos Matsaganis, The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case of
Greece, 21 J. EUR. SOC. POL. 501, 501 (2011)(“The revised figures stunned
public opinion at home and shocked markets abroad.”); Cf. Jones,
Kelemen & Meunier, supra note 88; Luc Eyraud, Vitor Gaspar & Tigran
Poghosyan, Fiscal Politics in the Euro Area, (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper WP/17/18, 2017).
131 See Nicole Scicluna, When Failure Isn’t Failure: European Union
Constitutionalism After the Lisbon Treaty, 50 J. COMMON. MKT. STUD. 441,
452 (2012) (“[T]he very projects that were meant to unite European
citizens and promote their common identity, such as the euro, are now
straining transnational solidarity and producing a rise in nationalist and
protectionist sentiments.”).
129
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harmonization. For example, before the financial crisis,
financial regulation was carried out by domestic regulators
applying harmonized rules of financial regulation.132 After
the crisis began, the EU agreed to make the European
Securities Market Authority (“ESMA”) responsible for
regulating credit ratings under a new EU regulation,133 and
controlling short selling.134 To address the financial trilemma
affecting the Eurozone,135 the EU established a European
Banking Union for the Eurozone in November 2014,
introducing a system of centralized supervision of banks
(but not of securities, insurance and pensions markets) for a
subset of EU Member States.136 The crises created changes in

See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, EU Financial Market Regulation after the
Global Financial Crisis: More Europe or More Risks, 47 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1317, 1319 (2010) (noting the pre-crisis “mis-match between the panEU operations of some major banking groups and nationally-based
supervision and resolution regimes.”).
133 See Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob de Haan, Regulating Credit Ratings in
the European Union: A Critical First Assessment of Regulation 1060/2009 on
Credit Rating Agencies, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1915, 1923 (2009).
134 See, e.g., Valia Babis, The Power to Ban Short-selling and Financial
Stability: the Beginning of a New Era for EU Agencies?, 73 CAMBRIDGE L. J.
266 (2014).
135 Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Trilemma, 111 ECON. LETTERS 57
(2011).
136 See, e.g., David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia., Banking Union as Holy
Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s
Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union, 51(S1) J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 103 (2013).
132
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legal institutions and arrangements that would not
otherwise have occurred.137 The move towards centralization
of financial regulation proceeded beyond banking with a
proposal to establish an EU Capital Markets Union.138 This
proposal was not driven by the same urgent need to control
risks as the Banking Union, but economic conditions seemed
to present an opportunity to make new progress on ideas
that had been around for some time.139 The Capital Markets
Action plan was related to the crises, as European bank
weaknesses limited lending, which made the development
of more effective EU capital markets a policy priority.140

See Arjen Boin, Madalina Busuioc & Martijn Groenleer, Building
European Union Capacity to Manage Transboundary Crises: Network or Leadagency Model?, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 418, 419 (2014) (“Over the past two
decades, the European Union (EU) has developed an array of crisis
management mechanisms that facilitate transboundary coordination and
cooperation. We might say that the EU has become a “policy laboratory”
for transboundary crisis management.”).
138 See EU Commission, Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63
final (Feb. 18, 2015); EU Commission Communication, Action Plan on
Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015).
139 See, e.g., Building a Capital Markets Union, supra note 138, at 2 (“It is
true that many of the issues at stake–insolvency and securities laws, tax
treatments–have been discussed for many years. The need to make
progress is, however, more pressing than ever. While this will be a longterm project, requiring sustained effort over many years, that should not
stop us making early progress.”).
140 See Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, supra note 138,
at 3 (“[I]ntegrated financial and capital markets can help Member States,
especially those inside the euro area, share the impact of shocks. By
137
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Unlike the Banking Union, the idea of the Capital Markets
Union is to encourage, rather than to control, financial
activity.141 If the Capital Markets Union project was
designed to reassure the UK that the EU was pro-market in
order to encourage the UK to feel better about EU
membership,142 it failed to persuade UK citizens. The UK’s
Brexit vote in June 2016 threatens to undermine the
achievement of the Capital Markets Union as the UK is the
EU Member State with the most active capital markets143 and
the dominant capital markets regulator.144 The Commission

opening up a wider range of funding sources, it will help to share
financial risks and mean that EU citizens and companies are less
vulnerable to banking contractions. Furthermore, more developed equity
markets, as opposed to increased indebtedness, allow for more
investment over the long term.”).
141 See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Capital Cohabitation: EU Capital Markets Union
as Public and Private Co-Regulation, 11 CAP. MKT L. J. 84 (2016).
142 Id. at 90.
143 See THE CITY UK, KEY FACTS ABOUT THE UK AS AN INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CENTRE, (2016) (“A high proportion of EU financial market
activity is concentrated in London and other cities in the UK, especially
in wholesale markets such as foreign exchange and OTC derivatives
trading and specialist markets such as hedge fund and marine insurance.
More than half of European investment banking activity is conducted in
the UK.”).
144 See, e.g., Reza Moghadam, How a Post-Brexit Redesign Can Save the
Capital Markets Union, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017) (“[A] regulatory
splintering is also on the cards — with adverse implications for
consistency and efficiency.”), www.ft.com/content/6682da18-efb0-11e6ba01-119a44939bb6; Cf. André Sapir, Dirk Schoenmaker & Nicolas
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encouraged the Member States to move forward with the
Capital Markets Union through a Communication published
in September 2016, a year after the Action Plan,145 and
thereafter, a new Consultation on Capital Markets Union in
January 2017,146 as a component of the Mid-term Review of
the Capital Markets Union proposal.147 During 2017, the
Commission published a White Paper and a number of
reflection papers148 on the future of the EU, including one on
the future of Economic and Monetary Union, which
describes progress on the Capital Markets Union as
“paramount.”149 The IMF agrees that completing the Capital
Markets Union is important.150
In 2017, the financial crises no longer seemed the most
urgent crises facing the EU, despite new worries about

Véron, Making the Best of Brexit for the EU27 Financial System, 1 Bruegel
Pol’y Brief (Feb. 2017).
145 EU Commission Communication, Capital Markets Union - Accelerating
Reform, at 2, COM (2016) 601 final (Sep. 14, 2016).
146 EU Commission, Consultation Document on Capital Markets Union
Mid-Term Review 2017 (Jan. 20, 2017)
147 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions on the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action
Plan, COM (2017) 292 final (June 8, 2017).
148 See Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe and the Way Forward,
COM (2017) 2025 (Mar. 1, 2017).
149 EU Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and
Monetary Union, at 20, COM (2017) 291 final (May 31, 2017).
150 IMF, supra note 8, at 33.
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Italian banks151 and continuing concerns about Greece.152
During 2015, more than a million people – refugees,
displaced persons, and other migrants – made their way to
the EU.153 In May 2015 the EU Commission developed a
European Agenda on Migration, which stated:
We need to restore confidence in our ability to
bring together European and national efforts to
address migration, to meet our international
and ethical obligations and to work together in
an effective way, in accordance with the
principles
of
solidarity
and
shared
responsibility. No Member State can effectively
address migration alone. It is clear that we
need a new, more European approach. This
requires using all policies and tools at our
disposal –combining internal and external
policies to best effect. All actors: Member
States,
EU
institutions,
International

Andreas (Andy) Jobst & Anke Weber, Profitability and Balance Sheet
Repair of Italian Banks, (Int’l Monetary Fund, WP/ 16/175, 2016).
152 See IMF, 2016 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and
Statement by the Executive Director for Greece, Country Report No. 17/40
(Feb. 2017).
153 See generally Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to
Record 1.3 Million in 2015, PEW RES. CTR (Aug. 2, 2016),
www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europesurges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/.
151
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Organisations, civil society, local authorities
and third countries need to work together to
make a common European migration policy a
reality.154
The EU entered into an agreement with Turkey whereby
Turkey would act to prevent migrants from moving to
Greece, and to address the problem of migrants dying in
transit.155 The agreement did succeed in limiting migration
into the EU from the Middle East.156 However, the
agreement also compromised the EU’s ability to criticize
Turkey for its own violations of the rule of law. The EU
found financing to support the identification of migrants
who did reach Greece,157 and for food and shelter.158
Nevertheless, some Member States were more willing than
others to accept some of the migrants who succeeded in
getting to Greece. In July 2016 the Commission proposed an

EU Commission Communication, A European Agenda on Migration, COM
(2015) 240 final (May 13, 2015).
155 Cf., Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 12,381; Deaths: 272, INT’L ORG.
FOR MIGRATION (Feb. 17, 2017), www.iom.int/news/mediterraneanmigrant-arrivals-reach-12381-deaths-272.
156 See FRONTEX, ANNUAL RISK ANALYSIS 2017, 6 (2017).
157 See, e.g., EU Commission, Daily News MEX/16/70, Commission
Provides Additional Support for Fingerprinting of Migrants in Greece
(Jan. 13, 2016).
158 See, e.g., EU Commission, Press Release IP/16/1447, EU Provides €83
Million to Improve Conditions for Refugees in Greece (Apr. 19, 2016).
154
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EU Resettlement Framework to establish a common
European policy on resettlement to ensure orderly and safe
pathways to Europe for persons in need of international
protection.159 The proposal made an appeal to an idea of
solidarity among Member States, aiming to share
responsibility for protection of refugees among EU Member
States fairly, so that the burden of protecting refugees did
not fall on States at the edges of the EU.160 These States had
already suffered more than northern EU Member States
from the financial crises.161 Newspapers reported stories of
Germans opening up their homes to migrants.162 However,

EU Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a Union
Resettlement Framework, COM (2016) 468 final (Jul. 13, 2016).
160 Id. at 3 (“[T]he proposal aims to: provide a common approach to safe
and legal arrival in the Union for third-country nationals in need of
international protection, thus also protecting them from exploitation by
migrant smuggling networks and endangering their lives in trying the
reach Europe; help reduce the pressure of spontaneous arrivals on the
Member States’ asylum systems; enable the sharing of the protection
responsibility with countries to which or within which a large number of
persons in need of international protection has been displaced and help
alleviate the pressure on those countries; provide a common Union
contribution to global resettlement efforts.”).
161 See Lillian M. Langford, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under
the Common European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity,
26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 217, 217 (2013).
162 See, e.g., Luke Harding, Philip Oltermann & Nicholas Watt, Refugees
Welcome? How UK and Germany Compare on Migration, THE GUARDIAN
(Sep. 2, 2015), www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/refugeeswelcome-uk-germany-compare-migration (“Thousands of ordinary
159
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official data on relocations of refugees show that progress is
slow .163 Additionally, the issue of migration and the need
for the protection of refugees have collided with concerns
about security after terrorist attacks in European cities.164
Whether or not the EU has dealt effectively with its financial
crises, the EU had powers with respect to the single market
and the Eurozone, and there was some level of common
agreement among members of the EU that something

Germans have volunteered to help the refugees now arriving daily.
Some have filled up their cars with shopping, and distributed clothes,
nappies, food and cuddly bears. Others have offered German lessons,
translation and babysitting.”).
163 See, e.g., EU Commission Communication, Ninth Report on Relocation and
Resettlement, at 3, COM (2017) 74 final (Feb. 8, 2017) (“After the adoption
of the 8th Report, the Commission called bilaterally on almost all
Member States to increase their efforts to meet the targets. Already active
Member States and Associated Countries reacted positively and
communicated to the Commission their planning for monthly pledges.
However, the picture is disappointing with certain other Member States.
Hungary, Austria and Poland remain the only Member States that have
not relocated anyone. Slovakia continues relocating on a very limited
basis and the Czech Republic has not pledged since May 2016 and has
not relocated anyone since August 2016.”).
164 See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism, at 3, COM
(2015) 625 final (Dec. 2, 2015) (“The existing rules need to be aligned
taking into account the changing terrorist threat Europe is facing. This
includes adequate criminal law provisions addressing the foreign
terrorist fighter phenomenon and risks related to the travel to third
countries to engage in terrorist activities but also the increased threats
from perpetrators who remain within Europe.”).

50

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 25

needed to be done. Although critics challenged some of the
EU’s responses to the financial crises as going beyond its
powers,165 or as misguidedly using intergovernmental
methods rather than Community methods, the EU did act to
calm the financial crises. But the EU’s acceptance of austerity
as a response to the crisis arguably intensified citizen
discomfort with the EU as a project that favoured elites.166 In
addition, the refugee crisis helped nourish a wave of
populism in the EU that seems to have affected the UK
Brexit vote and to be affecting elections in other EU Member
States.167

See Claes & Reestman, supra note 86; see also Babis, supra note 134.
See, e.g., Sarah B. Hobolt, The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided
Continent, 23 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1259, 1260 (2016) (“many voters across
Europe see the EU as part of the problem rather than the solution when
it comes to protecting ordinary citizens from the challenges of an ever
more globalized and integrated world.”); And see also e.g. id. at 1263-4
(“the Leave side successfully mobilized not only salient concerns about
immigration but also anti-establishment attitudes, portraying the vote as
a chance for ordinary citizens to ‘take back control’ from the élites in
Brussels.”).
167 Opposition to immigration was one of the major motivators of votes
to leave the EU. See, e.g., id. at 1263 (“the two key arguments that
resonate more with Remain voters than with Leave voters relate to the
economy, specifically the loss of economic stability in the event of Brexit
and the economic benefits of EU membership, while Leave voters
highlight mainly concerns about immigration as expressed by one
respondent: ‘Immigrants flooding into the country if we don’t regain
control of our own borders.’”); cf. Cigdem Kentmen-Cin & Cengiz Erisen,
165
166
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The next section of this paper looks at the current
tension in the EU and beyond between technocratic,
evidence-based policy-making and democratic governance.
V. TECHNOCRATIC VS POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
Although the European Economic Community
always had a Parliament, the Parliament originally had
limited powers and was not directly elected by citizens.168
The Parliament’s powers increased over time, but the
intergovernmental aspects of the EU remain significant.169
Although European citizens elect Members of the European
Parliament, voter turnout for these elections tends to be
low.170 Many commentators have critiqued the democratic

Anti-immigration Attitudes and the Opposition to European Integration: A
Critical Assessment, 18 EUR. UNION POL. 3 (2017).
168 See Eric Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of
Emerging “Political Control,” 13 INT’L ORG. 233, 233 (1959) (“[T]he
European Parliamentary Assembly is far from being a parliament.”).
169 See, e.g., Sergio Fabbrini, Intergovernmentalism in the European Union:. A
Comparative Federalism Perspective, 24 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 580, 581 (2017)
(“In the new policies, the Commission has come to play an implementing
rather than decision-making role, whereas the EP has been downsized in
its influence and power.”).
170 Results of the 2014 European Elections: Turnout, European Parliament,
www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html, (last
visited Apr. 13, 2017).
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deficit in Europe,171 and others have argued for thinking
about justifying Europe on the basis of output legitimacy.172
They argued that the legitimacy of the EU could be assessed
based on what it did, as much as on how it did what it
did.173 Assessing what the EU has done is a complex and
highly technical exercise, and involves experts rather than
citizens. Citizens with higher levels of education are more
likely to be receptive to arguments based on expertise and it
is not surprising that more highly educated citizens have
more positive views of the EU than less educated citizens.174
However, failures of technocratic policy-making
worry even those who may be inclined to accept technocratic

See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Ulrich Haltern & Franz Mayer, European
Democracy and its Critique: Five Uneasy Pieces (European Univ. Inst. Robert
Schuman Ctr., EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/11, 1995). Cf. Henig,
supra note 53, at 130 (“However, it is legitimacy and not democracy
which is the critical operating condition for integration. It follows that at
least part of the debate over the future role of the European Parliament
has been in a false context. Even on the assumption that the granting of
more powers to that body is equivalent to making the Community more
democratic, the act of doing this may contribute little towards making
the institutions legitimate.”).
172 See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”:
Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
603 (2002).
173 Cf. Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in
the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 533
(2006).
174 See Hobolt, supra note 166, at 1265.
171

2017

EUROPEAN (DIS)UNION

53

justifications for policy decisions. The financial crisis and the
EU’s response to it, raises issues about the effectiveness of
policy-making in the EU and in other parts of the world,
especially with respect to financial regulation. The prefinancial crisis paradigm of financial regulation was one in
which technocratic regulators acknowledged and deferred to
the expertise of market actors to identify and control risk.175
But, investigations of the financial crisis found deregulation
and excessive faith in mathematical models were important
causes of the crisis.176 This was not just an issue for the EU.
Domestic policy-makers within Member States and
elsewhere adopted the deregulatory and risk-management
paradigm of financial regulation that helped to generate the
crisis, and EU institutions also participated in these
developments. Since the financial crisis, there are reasons to
continue to doubt whether financial regulation in the EU
and elsewhere is as effective as it needs to be. For example,
financial institutions have been targets of enforcement

See Caroline Bradley, Changing Perceptions of Systemic Risk in Financial
Regulation, in AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SHIFTING LEGAL, ECONOMIC
AND
POLITICAL PARADIGMS (Pablo
Iglesias-Rodriguez, Anna
Triandafyllidou, & Ruby Gropas, 2016).
176 See Brooksley Born, Forward: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the
Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2011); see also Ross Levine,
The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent
Crisis, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 39 (2012); FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE
TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING
CRISIS, 22 (Mar. 2009).
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actions relating to manipulation of benchmarks and failures
of compliance.177 Meanwhile, the EU’s Capital Markets
Union proposal, which emphasized the need to break down
barriers, both in national law and in the EU’s prospectus
rules,178 demonstrated an openness to the idea that financial
regulation should not impede the financing of business. The
Commission argues the EU Capital Markets Union is
important because of ongoing weaknesses in EU banking
markets since the financial crisis.179 In most EU Member
States, banking has been more important as a source of
funding for business activity than capital markets.180 The

See In re Deutsche Bank AG, N.Y Dept. Fin. Serv., Consent Order Under
New York Banking Law §§ 39, 44 and 44-a (“[T]his Consent Order
addresses serious compliance deficiencies identified in the Department’s
investigation that spanned Deutsche Bank’s global enterprise. These
flaws allowed a corrupt group of bank traders and offshore entities to
improperly and covertly transfer more than $10 billion out of Russia, by
conscripting Deutsche Bank operations in Moscow, London and New
York to their improper purpose.”).
178 EU Commission Communication, Action Plan on Building a Capital
Markets Union, COM (2015) 468 final (Sep. 30, 2015).
179 See, e.g., EU Commission, Consultation Document: Capital Markets Union
Mid-Term Review 2017 at 4 (Jan. 2017) (“The EU economy needs bigger
and better capital markets to help break its reliance on bank lending and
diversify its sources of funding.”) [hereinafter Capital Markets Union
Mid-Term Review 2017].
180 See IMF, European Union: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note on European Securities and Markets Authority, Country
Report No. 13/69, at 6 (Mar. 2013) (“The EU financial systems are mostly
bank-based.”); Id. at 4 (“Europe has a shortage of risk capital for small,
177
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UK, which now plans to leave the EU, is a major
exception.181 Although the Capital Markets Union
documents suggest a need to balance facilitation of markets
with regulation,182 there are reasons to be concerned that EU
policy-makers may focus more on encouraging the EU
capital markets to develop than on ensuring the necessary
level of regulation of those markets.183
If the crisis itself led citizens to be skeptical of the EU
as an effective policy-making entity, the EU’s response to the
financial crisis did not help. The EU’s response to the crisis
increased the EU’s democratic deficit.184 Moreover, austerity,

early-stage growing businesses. This is holding back the development of
high-growth sectors such as technology which are essential for economic
competitiveness. While sources of capital such as crowdfunding and
business angels are becoming more accessible, the EU is still at a
significant disadvantage to the United States.”).
181 See, e.g., William Wright, Julio Suarez, Paul McGhee & Laurence Bax,
The Benefits of Capital Markets to High-potential EU Economies, at 6, AFME,
(Nov. 2016), www.afme.eu/en/reports/publications/the-benefits-ofcapital-markets-to-high-potential-eu-economies.
182 Capital Markets Union Mid-Term Review 2017, supra note 179, at 14
(“There is a need to ensure that the regulatory framework strikes an
appropriate balance between enabling the development of FinTech on a
pan-EU basis and ensuring confidence for investors.”).
183 Cf. AFME, THE SHORTAGE OF RISK CAPITAL FOR EUROPE’S HIGH
GROWTH BUSINESSES 4-5 (Mar. 2017).
184 See Giandomenico Majone, From Regulatory State to a Democratic
Default, 52 J COMMON MKT. STUD. 1216, 1216 (2014).
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imposed on countries like Greece,185 or adopted voluntarily
as in the UK,186 burdened the more vulnerable members of
European societies.187 Such circumstances can lead citizens
to become politically engaged in new ways,188 or to see

See Sofia Vasilopoulou, Daphne Halikiopoulou &Theofanis
Exadaktylos, Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame,
52 J COMMON MKT. STUD 388, 388 (2014).
186 See HM Treasury, Budget 2010, HC 61 (Jun. 22, 2010) at 1 (“The most
urgent task facing this country is to implement an accelerated plan to
reduce the deficit. Reducing the deficit is a necessary precondition for
sustained economic growth. To continue with the existing fiscal plans
would put the recovery at risk, given the scale of the challenge. High
levels of debt also put an unfair burden on future generations.”); Michael
Kitson, Ron Martin & Peter Tyler, The Geographies of Austerity, 4 CAMB. J.
REGIONS, ECON. & SOC. 289, 294 (2011) (“In the UK, ‘the ConservativeLiberal Democrat coalition government announced the biggest cuts in
state spending since World War II. Savings estimated at about £83bn are
to be made over four years. The plan is to cut 490,000 public sector jobs.
Most Whitehall departments face budget cuts of 19% on average.’”) Cf.
Dawn Holland & Jonathan Portes, Self-Defeating Austerity?, 222 NAT’L
INST. ECON. REV. F4, F4 (2012).
187 See Ulrich Beck, Why ‘Class’ Is Too Soft a Category to Capture the
Explosiveness of Social Inequality at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century,
64 BRIT. J. SOC. 63, 68 (2013) (“The risks posed by big banks are being
socialized by the state and imposed on retirees through austerity
dictates.”).
188 Cf. McDonald, supra note 49, at 54 (“[T]he economic models that
informed the market, and the political science models that have
informed moments of institutional optimism, have not been models in
which people have figured other than as ciphers embodying an ideal
rationality that the model-makers themselves construct. Real post-1970s
185
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political issues in other ways.189 This does not mean that
citizens will become interested in the technical details of
complex policy areas such as financial regulation, although
some commentators argue that the defects of technocratic
policy-making require more democratic input.190 But
whether or not citizens get involved in technical policy
details, when they are invited to express their views in
elections or referenda their actions raise questions about the
future of the European project. Brexit is one obvious
example of this sort of development.
The current tension between populist politics, which
tends to discount complex thinking and to be suspicious of
detailed evidence, and the technocratic policy-making
processes characteristic of the neoliberal economic order is
apparent in the UK, but also in the US.191 During the
campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum, Michael
Gove, then the UK’s Justice Secretary, said that “people in

people have burst onto the scene in elections and referenda, however,
sending EC officials diving for cover until their optimism could be restoked.”).
189 See Alexia Katsanidou & Simon Otjes, How the European Debt Crisis
Reshaped National Political Space: The Case of Greece, 17 EUR. UNION POL.
279-81 (2016).
190 See, e.g., Marija Bartl, Contesting Austerity: On the Limits of EU
Knowledge Governance, 44 J L. & SOC’Y. 150, 150 (2017).
191 See, e.g., Nye, supra note 18, at 14-15.
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this country have had enough of experts.”192 And, since the
Brexit referendum, increasing evidence that it will be
difficult for the UK to negotiate terms for Brexit that would
give the UK Leave voters what they seem to have wanted,193
does not seem to have diminished the calls for Brexit,194
although by the late summer of 2017 some politicians and
commentators focused on the idea of a lengthy transition

See, e.g., Henry Mance, Britain Has Had Enough of Experts, Says Gove,
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 3, 2016), www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c; Fraswer Nelson, Michael Gover Was
(Accidentally) Right about Experts, THE SPECTATOR (Jan 14, 2017),
https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/michael-gove-was-accidentallyright-about-experts/#.
193 See, e.g., Chris Giles, Brexit Will Damage UK Standards of Living, Say
Economists,
FINANCIAL
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2017),
www.ft.com/content/dc62922a-204b-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9;
Monica
Langella & Alan Manning, Who Voted Leave?, CentrePiece Autumn
2016 at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp479.pdf; Aditya Aney,
Alberto Gallo, Pablo Morenes & Tao Pan, Brexit Could Be the Best Thing
That Happened to the European Union, (Apr. 12, 2017),
weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/brexit-european-union-negotiations.
194 Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister, has been determined that Brexit
means Brexit, and notified the EU of the UK’s intention to leave the EU
in March 2017. See Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article
50
(Mar.
29,
2017),
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_
Donald_Tusk.pdf.
192
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period to mitigate the harms of Brexit.195
However, the UK is not the only place where voters
who feel that the global economy has been managed in ways
that disadvantage them have turned to politicians who claim
to oppose existing arrangements for international trade. In
France, presidential candidate Marine Le Pen (who lost to
Emmanuel Macron)196 argued that France should leave the
Eurozone.197 Supporters of free trade have attempted to
respond with arguments that the problem is not the fact of
free trade, but rather, how politicians respond to the effects
of free trade.198 The European Union has attempted to
navigate for many years this balance between free trade and
protecting citizens as workers and consumers and
beneficiaries of fundamental rights. But the financial crisis,
the response to the crisis and the refugee crisis combined to
produce stresses that the EU institutions had difficulty
addressing effectively.

See, e.g., Leonid Bershidsky, Brexit Is Beginning to Look Like No Brexit,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Aug. 28, 2017), bloomberg.com/view/articles/201708-28/brexit-is-beginning-to-look-like-no-brexit.
196 See, e.g., Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Macron Wins Solid Majority in
French Assembly Election, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jun. 19, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/a4e5f15e-5442-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2.
197 See, e.g., Jean Tirole, Ideas of Protectionism or Ditching the Euro Stalk the
French
Vote,
FINANCIAL
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2017),
www.ft.com/content/8d5887d2-1f8a-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c .
198 See, e.g., IMF, World Bank, WTO, Making Trade an Engine of Growth for
All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment (Mar. 2017).
195
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The EU Commission commemorated the 60th
anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome by
publishing a White Paper on the Future of Europe.199 The
White Paper began by quoting Robert Schumann’s idea that
“`Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a
single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements
which first create a de facto solidarity.” 200 Recent
developments raise questions about the state of European
solidarity. The UK’s Brexit vote is a new example of what
has been a recurrent feature of the UK’s relationship with
the rest of Europe over the last 60 years.201 Nevertheless,
questions about the relationship between the Member States
and the EU have also been raised in elections in other
Member States, even in France, one of the original six
Member States. These questions are part of a broader
willingness to challenge neoliberalism202
Many factors have contributed to the EU’s current

White Paper on the Future of Europe, supra note 148.
Id. at 4; see also Schuman supra note 30.
201 Cf. Daddow, supra note 17, at 214 (“Europe has always been
constructed and perceived as a ‘choice’ for the British who can
apparently be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Europe and more often than not ‘semidetached’ from it. These tensions indicate Britain’s unresolved identity as
a truly European nation”).
202 See, e.g., Nye, supra note 18.
199
200
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existential crisis, but the crisis raises a fundamental question:
what good is transnational governance if it cannot protect
citizens from the transmission of risks across borders,
whether those risks are financial, related to climate change,
disease, or produced by conflict in other parts of the world.
And this question raises a further set of questions about
what institutional arrangements for multilevel governance
or quasi-federal structures might be sufficiently resilient to
adapt to the sorts of changing circumstances and crises that
the world is likely to face in the near future. It is too early to
know whether the EU’s governance structures are
sufficiently resilient to survive existing and forthcoming
stresses.
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